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Forget the Whales: Expanding the Twilight and
Diminishing the Nadir of Youngstown
I. INTRODUCTION
Moments into then-Judge Samuel Alito’s 2006 confirmation
hearings, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee promptly directed
their discussion toward the limits of presidential powers.1 Very recently,
it had been discovered that the executive administration had conducted
warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens, “intentionally
bypassing the secret federal court that is supposed to oversee [such]
sensitive investigations.”2 Referring to the surveillance program as an
exposed abuse of executive power, Republican Senator Arlen Spector
remarked that such a system put the vital “equilibrium established by our
constitutional system” at stake.3 Of course, this dialogue inevitably led to
a discussion of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 4 very often recognized as the system used to
delimit presidential power. Taking a cue from his future chief justice,
who more than three months earlier in his own confirmation hearings
endorsed Jackson’s concurrence by stating that it “set the framework for
consideration of questions of executive power in times of war and with
respect to foreign affairs,”5 Justice Alito signaled his understanding of
the matter by stating that “no person in this country, no matter how high
or powerful, is above the law.”6
However, only two years after making those statements, both
Justices found themselves in a majority which would rewrite the
boundaries set in Youngstown when the Executive was faced by one of
its most unlikely opponents to date—the beaked whale. In Winter v.
1. ADAM LIPTAK, A QUICK FOCUS ON THE POWERS OF A PRESIDENT, N.Y. Times, J AN. 10,
2006, AT A1.
2. Josh Meyer, Leak in Domestic Spy Program Investigated, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2005, at
A1. This “secret” federal court is the FISA Court, established by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act in 1978, which is comprised of eleven district court judges that “have jurisdiction
to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the
United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2006).
3. Liptak, supra note 1, at A1.
4. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
5. Liptak, supra note 1, at 16 (quoting Chief Justice John G. Roberts during his
confirmation hearing).
6. Liptak, supra note 1, at 16.
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Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,7 the Executive (in the
incarnation of the United States Navy) is pitted against Congress’s
champion, a few hundred Pacific cetaceans protected from potentially
harmful government practices through a Congressional statute. 8 At the
end of the bout, the Executive was the branch left standing, and the
results of this confrontation may have caused serious changes to the
constitutional balance of power. First, the Supreme Court opened a new
avenue of presidential power by allowing the Executive to seek the
protection of independent emergency powers even if such an emergency
is caused by the Executive’s own neglect or disregard for the law.
Second, the Supreme Court significantly lowered the threshold which
triggers emergency executive powers by deferring to the Executive for
determinations of necessity. Although the parameters of presidential
power had been previously set in place, Winter effectively expanded
those powers, both broadening Youngstown’s zone of twilight, and
diminishing its nadir.9
This Note will analyze and explore Winter and its implications by
first setting the stage with a brief explanation of executive emergency
and commander-in-chief powers, including their relation to the
Youngstown taxonomy. Then, this Note will frame the issue by providing
a factual background to Winter and the disputed statute. Finally, this
Note will explain the holding of Winter and how it introduced an
expansion of executive power.
II. LIMITS TO PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Article II of the Constitution vests “The executive Power” in the
President of the United States 10 and makes him, or her, the “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy.” 11 This investiture grants powers that are
both vast and fluid to a single branch of the government. The vastness of
these powers confers a broad reach upon the Executive, allowing it to act
in the best interests of the people in areas where the Constitution has
7. 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
8. In this case, the Navy sought to use mid-frequency active (“MFA”) sonar during
submarine-warfare training exercises. The use of this sonar arguably causes serious injuries to
whales and other marine mammals, “including permanent hearing loss, decompression sickness, and
major behavioral disruptions.” Id. at 371. The respondents filed their petition for an injunction with
the hopes of providing protection for the beaked whales in that region by requiring the government
to fulfill certain statutory requirements that they had overlooked. Id. at 371–73. These statutory
requirements, including the mandatory filing of an Environmental Impact Statement, are detailed
infra Part III.
9. See infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text (providing a description of what is meant
by the “twilight” and “nadir” of executive powers).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
11. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
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barred its co-equal branches from operating. The fluidity of these powers
makes them adaptable to situations as they arise, inherently endowing the
Executive with the authority to create adequate and immediate remedies
for emergency situations. Nevertheless, this authority to act swiftly and
decisively does have boundaries. This section will sketch the blurry
limits of those boundaries as they existed before Winter by briefly
defining the inner limits of those powers as they are found in Justice
Jackson’s tripartite classification. This section will subsequently delve
into the outer reaches of executive power by specifically examining the
broad commander-in-chief powers, especially in dealing with
emergencies, before moving on to consider the case at issue.
A. Youngstown Limitations
In 1951, a war had been raging on the Korean Peninsula for more
than eighteen months12 when “a dispute arose between the steel
companies and their employees over [the] terms and conditions that
should be included in new collective bargaining agreements.” 13 After
multiple failed attempts to come to an agreement, the steelworkers
threatened a nation-wide strike. 14
President Truman recognized the Korean Crisis as an emergency and
deemed that a “work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil
our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting
aggression, [adding] to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and
airmen engaged in combat in the field.” 15 Under these circumstances, and
citing his powers as Commander-in-Chief as authorization to take drastic
measures for the protection of the Union, 16 the President issued an
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession
of most of the Nation’s steel mills in order to keep them running.17
Although the majority opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Black,
would clearly set a precedent in denying President Truman such an
interpretation of executive powers, it is Justice Jackson’s concurrence
that lives on by effectively delineating a three-category system for
measuring the constitutionality of executive action. 18 In the first category
12. See BURTON IRA KAUFMAN, THE KOREAN CONFLICT 3 (1999).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
14. Id. at 582–83.
15. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 65–66 (1953).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39 (Jackson, J., concurring). See, e.g., Tara L. Branum,
President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS . 1,
62 (2002) (“Despite the numerous opinions issued in Youngstown upholding the importance of a
system of checks and balances, Justice Jackson’s concurrence may have been the most important, as
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of Jackson’s classification, the “zenith” of executive power, a President
acts “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.” 19
Accordingly, the Executive’s powers are at their maximum because the
inherent powers granted to the Executive by the Constitution are fully
supplemented by the approbation of Congress and the strength of his
own Article I powers.20 In the second or intermediate category, known as
the “zone of twilight,” the President “and Congress may have concurrent
authority,” or, to put it more simply, “[the authority’s] distribution is
uncertain.”21 Here, Justice Jackson admits, is a place where the extent of
either branch’s constitutional authority truly depends on the
circumstances and not on any “abstract theories of law.”22 The third and
final category of Justice Jackson’s taxonomy, which may be termed as
the nadir of presidential authority, occurs when “the President takes
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress.”23 In this category, the President may only rely “upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter.”24
After Youngstown, the Supreme Court found that Justice Jackson’s
dicta provided a functional scale for its own analysis 25 and officially
followed it.26 Since that decision, Jackson’s approach has been employed
in multiple opinions.27 However, its interpretation has begun to evolve in
order to fill analytical gaps.28 In Winter, although it is certainly clear that
Youngstown stood for the idea that the Executive may not independently

it is perhaps the most thorough judicial evaluation of the use of presidential directives, and it is often
relied upon.” (citation omitted)).
19. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 635–36.
21. Id. at 637.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (stating that the court has found
Justice Jackson’s analysis to be “analytically useful”).
26. Id. at 661 (“Justice Jackson, . . . in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, . . . brings
together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area . . . .”); see also
Thomas A. O’Donnell, Note, Illumination or Elimination of the “Zone of Twilight”? Congressional
Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 99 (1982)
(stating that the Supreme Court had ignored Justice Jackson’s classifications until Dames & Moore);
Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 441 n.165 (2007)
(“A majority of the Court adopted Justice Jackson’s approach in Dames & Moore v. Regan . . . .”).
27. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Morrison v.
Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988); Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989); Clinton v.
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 473 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson’s
Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medillin, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 690 (2009) (arguing that
post-Hamdan and Medillin, Justice Jackson’s concurrence has come to resemble much more the
majority opinion of Justice Black).
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legislate and invade the jurisdiction of Congress, 29 the Supreme Court
gave Justice Jackson’s analysis an evolutionary shove as it attempted to
remedy the fact that it “did not contemplate calling for an examination of
implied presidential authority under the imminent danger doctrine.” 30
B. The Commander-in-Chief
Following the chaotic years under the Articles of Confederation and
during the drafting process, the Framers acknowledged the need for a
strong executive who could act decisively in times of emergency. 31
History had already proven to them that a powerful executive in
troubling times was an absolute requirement for effective government.
As students of the Classics, they recognized that Rome was effectively
able to fight off the “assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy” by
taking “refuge in the absolute power of a single man.” 32 They understood
that:
Among all the other Roman institutions, [the dictatorship] truly
deserves to be considered and numbered among those which were the
source of the greatness of such an empire, because without a similar
system cities survive . . . only with difficulty. . . . When a republic lacks
such a procedure, it must necessarily come to ruin by obeying its laws or
break them in order to avoid its own ruin.33
Consequently, “the language of the Constitution makes the President
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and puts no limitation on his
power in this capacity.”34 Although Congress maintains the power “to
declare war,”35 “to raise and support armies,” 36 “to provide for and
maintain a Navy,”37 and to make rules for the “Government and
Regulation of land and naval Forces,”38 the Executive, as President,
maintains sole command of the military. 39

29. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89.
30. Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: Examining the
Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 184 (2009).
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“Of all the
cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 384 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
33. NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, D ISCOURSES ON LIVY 95 (Julia Conaway Bondanella & Peter
Bondanella trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1531).
34. United States v. Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105, 117 (C.M.A. 1962).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
36. Id. at cl. 12.
37. Id. at cl. 13.
38. Id. at cl. 14.
39. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Congress cannot deprive the
President of the command of the army and navy.”).
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These broad powers supposedly grant the President supreme
authority over all matters concerning the defense of the United States. 40
Logically, since the defense of a nation consists of more than retaliation
in the face of an attack, this would infer that the President also maintains
that same supremacy in times of peace in preparing the armed forces for
the defense of the nation. 41 Indeed, before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor and the subsequent entrance of the United States into World War
II, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson declared that the President “may
order the carrying out of maneuvers or training, or the preparation of
fortifications, or the instruction of others in matters of defense, to
accomplish the same objective of safety of the country.”42 As maintained
by Attorney General Jackson, the powers of the Commander-in-Chief
“exist in time of peace as well as in time of war.”43
However, constitutional powers contestably grant the Executive
broad authority to act unilaterally in times of emergency, sometimes
even bending the boundaries set by the Constitution. 44 Arguably, many
of the Framers expected there to be moments where the Executive would
need to act out of necessity, for the preservation of the Union, and
implicitly left this license to the President’s branch. 45
This concept of unhindered executive action in times of emergency
has been ratified through both presidential practice and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. During one of America’s darkest hours, President
Abraham Lincoln took some constitutionally questionable measures in
order to preserve the Union.46 Understanding the responsibility of his
office and the weight of self-preservation, Lincoln explained that he
made those extra-constitutional decisions because he “felt that measures,
otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming
40. See William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916) (“When we come to the power
of the President as Commander-in-Chief it seems perfectly clear that Congress could not order
battles to be fought on a certain plan, and could not direct parts of the army to be moved from one
part of the country to another.”).
41. WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
1566 (2d ed. 1929) (“Through, or under, his orders, therefore, all military operations in times of
peace, as well as of war, are conducted. He has within his control the disposition of troops, the
direction of vessels of war and the planning and execution of campaigns.”).
42. Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941).
43. Id. at 61.
44. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“While emergency
does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power.”).
45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 225 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“It is in vain to
oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it
plants in the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ
of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions.”).
46. President Lincoln argued that under the “Take Care Clause,” he had the authority to
suspend certain constitutional rights in order to preserve the Union. Michael P. Kelly, Fixing the
War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 112 n.135 (1993).
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indispensible to the preservation of the constitution, through the
preservation of the nation.”47 More recently, the administration of
President George W. Bush also maintained its ability to play the
emergency card, even in spite of Congressional restraints, “when[ever]
there is a ‘belief that an attack might be imminent.’” 48
The Supreme Court has been less explicit concerning this position;
nevertheless, it has remained clearly supportive. Clearly recognizing the
requirement of decisive action in times of immediate necessity,
especially during an impending invasion, the Court has declared that the
Executive “is not only authorized but bound to resist by force . . . without
waiting for any special legislative authority.” 49 Even when employing
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown dicta, then-Justice Rehnquist recognized
that the tripartite taxonomy could be an oversimplification of matters,
meaning that simply because the President acts contrary to congressional
mandate does not necessarily mean that his actions are unconstitutional. 50
This is especially true in cases “involving responses to international
crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to
anticipate in any detail.”51 Common sense simply cannot require a
doctrinaire interpretation of the Constitution when such would transform
it into a “suicide pact.”52
In spite of a common-sense need for flexibility to the Constitution,
common sense also requires that that such flexibility not extend to the
point of abuse. Therefore, it would appear that executive emergency
powers fit into Justice Jackson’s nadir, being an inherent power that is
available in spite of congressional disapproval, yet confined to the rarest
of circumstances. Unfortunately, as demonstrated below, Winter
broadens those circumstances, effectively diminishing the nadir and
expanding the twilight of Jackson’s taxonomy.

47. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Sen. Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 585 (1989). Interestingly, former
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, whom many consider a modern executive who abused his
powers in office, cited Abraham Lincoln’s “suspension of some rights during the American Civil
War as justification for his own state of emergency” in 2007. David Rohde, Pakistani Sets
Emergency Rule, Defying the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at A14.
48. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’ L L. REV. 1, 3–
4 (2008) (citing Greg Miller, Waterboarding is Still an Option; The White House Calls the
Technique Legal, Stunning Critiques, L.A. T IMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1) (explaining that the President
reserves the right to use harsh interrogation techniques, contrary to any Congressional mandate,
when he or she feels that the use of such techniques would be in the best interest of the nation).
49. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
50. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
51. Id.
52. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
RICHARD A. POSNER, N OT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF N ATIONAL
EMERGENCY 1–15 (2006).
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III. WHALES SHMALES, THERE’S A NATION TO DEFEND!
Understanding this new change in the constitutional balance of
powers will best be done by first obtaining some background to Winter
through examining the statute at issue and then moving on to describe the
case and its holding. Therefore, this section will begin by explaining the
history and purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
through an examination of its language and legislative history. Then the
section will dive directly into Winter to explain the Supreme Court’s
holding, as well as its reasoning, and the following section will address
the implications of its holding.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
In 1969, after taking note of “[t]he public’s growing concern . . . seen
in the form of citizen indignation and protest over the actions or, in some
cases, the lack of action of Federal agencies . . . [that] have contributed to
environmental decay and degradation,” 53 Congress recognized that when
it had established some federal policies, it had “no body of experience or
precedent for . . . consideration of environmental factors . . . .”54 Until
that point, environmental policy had essentially been “established by
default and inaction.”55 Therefore, desiring to “restore public confidence
in the Federal Government’s capacity to . . . maintain and enhance the
quality of the environment,”56 Congress passed the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Henceforth, it would be “the
continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . to use all practicable
means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony.” 57
To accomplish this objective, the Act requires that, among other
things, federal agencies prepare and file an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”) for any “major Federal action[] significantly affecting

53. S. REP. N O. 91-296, at 8 (1969). The Senate Report specifically cites the Santa Barbara
oil spill of 1969 as an example of government negligence. Id. The spill occurred as a result of human
error as well as the fact that the drilling company had been “granted a waiver by the United States
Geological Survey that allowed [it] to use a shorter casing on the [drilling] pipe than Federal
Standards prescribed.” Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A
Retrospective, 64 YEARBOOK OF THE ASS’ N OF PACIFIC COAST GEOGRAPHERS 157, 158 (2002),
available at http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf. The casing was
supposed to reinforce the pipe in order to prevent blow-outs. Id. The oil spill led to significant
community and government action. See S. REP. NO. 91–296 at 8.
54. S. REP. N O. 91-296 at 19.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Id. at 8.
57. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006).
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the quality of the human environment.” 58 These reports should detail any
adverse effects, both temporary and permanent, that a proposed federal
action would create as well as propose more environmentally friendly
alternatives to that action.59 Because some “actions—often actions
having irreversible consequences—are undertaken without adequate
consideration of, or knowledge about, their impact on the
environment,”60 this new federal requirement was supposed to ensure
that “the environmental impact of [any] proposed action [had] been
studied and that the results of the studies [had] been given
consideration”61 before any final decision is taken.62
It is important to note that the Act does not proscribe any federal
activities that could be harmful to the environment. In fact, it merely
requires that details about “any adverse environmental effects which
cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,”63 be included in
the EIS. Congress clearly understood that some actions, in the interest of
the people, would have to be taken—regardless of their impact on the
environment.64 Indeed, it should therefore be clear that the intended
purpose of the required EIS is to “serve practically as an important
contribution to the decision-making process,”65 not as an ultimate
impediment to the execution of federal actions.
B. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council
However, the Navy failed to comply with NEPA when it was to
commence training exercises in March 2007 off the coast of California,
so the EIS became a barrier. Anxious to begin its training and not
wanting to wait for the completion of an EIS, the Navy determined that,
based on data already collected concerning the environmental effect of
its exercises, 66 it could proceed with its training without filing an EIS. 67
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
59. Id.
60. S. REP. N O. 91-296 at 9.
61. Id. at 20.
62. Justice Ginsburg made certain to point out the fact that the EIS is supposed to be
completed and filed before any other action has taken place so that it might serve its important
advisory role. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 390 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
64. S. REP. N O. 91-296 at 20 (implying that some actions will be taken in spite of their
environmental impact by declaring that an “action leading to . . . adverse environmental effects
[must be] justified by other considerations of national policy and those other considerations must be
stated in the finding”).
65. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (2009) (“The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can
serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be used to
rationalize or justify decisions already made.”).
66. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372.
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Nonetheless, when the Navy’s actions were challenged, a United States
District Court held that the Navy’s findings were inadequate and that its
actions violated NEPA. 68 The court enjoined the Navy from continuing
its exercises without filing an EIS unless it significantly adjusted those
exercises to mitigate their impact if they were to continue without filing
an EIS.69 The Navy sought relief from the Executive, which granted it,
finding that the continuation of the Navy’s training exercises was a
necessity and believing that the mitigating actions were too restrictive to
fully simulate real combat situations. 70
Immediately, the Executive, in the form of the President, declared
“that continuation of the exercises . . . was ‘essential to national
security.’”71 The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”), an office
within the Executive, 72 determined that the District Court’s injunction
created an emergency, interpreting the President’s declaration to mean
that the strictures on training would “undermine the Navy’s ability . . . to
ensure the combat effectiveness of . . . strike groups.”73 The CEQ,
through the power of the Executive, authorized the Navy to implement
practice arrangements alternative to those mandated by the judiciary so
that it could continue its training exercises in spite of the judgment. 74
Although the Navy never conceded that it had a responsibility to file
an EIS under NEPA,75 its key argument was no longer focused on the
statute when the case reached the Supreme Court. In oral argument, the
Navy claimed that, in light of the emergency circumstances created by
the district court’s injunction, the Executive Branch’s authorization

67. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, No. 8:07-cv-00225-FMC-FMOX, 2007 WL
2481037 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007); Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372. Instead of filing an EIS, the Navy
filed an Environmental Assessment. Id. This is a “concise public document” which is supposed to
“[b]riefly provide sufficient evidence for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact
statement or a finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(a) (2009). If a federal agency,
when filing an Environmental Assessment, finds that there should be no significant environmental
impact caused by any proposed federal action, an EIS is not required. See Id. § 1508.13 (2009).
However, as was noted by Justice Ginsburg, “by definition, an [Environmental Assessment] alone
does not satisfy an agency’s obligation under NEPA if the effects of a proposed action require
preparation of a full EIS.” Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 388 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Winter, 2007 WL 2481037 at *6, *11.
69. See id. at *11.
70. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373.
71. Id. at 373, 378 (citation omitted).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (“There is created in the Executive Office of the President a Council on
Environmental Quality . . . [which shall be] composed of three members who shall be appointed by
the President to serve at his pleasure, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”).
73. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (quotation marks omitted) (citing the petitioner’s brief).
74. Id. at 373–74.
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Winter, 129 S. Ct. 365 (No. 07-1239) (“The Navy has
never conceded that it was required to do an EIS at the outset. It simply has agreed to live with the
alternative arrangements approved by the Council on Environmental Quality.”).
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permitted the Navy to continue its training without interruption.76 The
majority of the Court agreed.77
With a tone clearly expressing a deep sense of urgency, 78 Chief
Justice Robert’s majority opinion completely bypasses the merits of the
case, refusing to even address whether the Navy violated NEPA. 79
According to the Chief Justice, two other very significant issues
controlled the matter. First, the injunction prohibited the Navy from
“conduct[ing] realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to
neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines.”80 Second, the
Executive, through statements made by the Navy, the CEQ, and the
President himself, recognized that the forced interruption of these
exercises created a national defense emergency. 81 As it was thus parsed
down, the majority recognized that the Navy’s interests in continuing its
training clearly outweighed any environmental interests served by
complying with NEPA.82 Therefore, since a court sitting in equity does
not necessarily have to rule in favor of the party that would win on the
merits,83 the Court found in favor of the Navy. In sum, because any
injury caused by the Navy’s failure to comply with the statute “is
outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s interest in effective,
realistic training of its sailors,” the Navy did not need to conform with
NEPA’s requirements.84
IV. IMPLICATIONS: WINTER’S EXPANDING EMERGENCY
Although Framers, such as Alexander Hamilton, viewed the
emergency prerogative of the dictators of the Roman Republic with
favor, it has always been evident that it was the abuse of those temporary
and yet expansive emergency powers that led to the demise of the Roman
Republic and the creation of the Roman Empire. 85 Consequently, none of
76. Id. at 10 (“[W]e had no duty to prepare an environmental impact statement because of the
intervening event of the Council for Environmental Quality’s emergency circumstances alternative
arrangements determination.”).
77. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
78. Chief Justice Robert’s opinion was heavily garnished with words such as “critical,” id. at
370, “mission critical,” id. at 371, and “threat,” id. at 382, granting the whole of his opinion a sense
of urgency as he addressed the facts of the case.
79. Id. at 381 (“Given that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not
that it must cease sonar training, there is no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly
alleged to pose a serious threat to national security.”).
80. Id. at 382.
81. Id. at 373–74.
82. Id. at 382.
83. Id. at 381.
84. Id. at 376.
85. Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun
Prohibition in England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399,
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the Framers believed that the Constitution should ever grant the
Executive absolute and unfettered authority.86 Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court in Winter took a step in that direction when it erroneously
stretched the normal boundaries of emergency executive powers. First,
the Court expanded the legal definition of emergency in a manner that
would allow the Executive to seek the protection of “self-made”
emergencies. Second, it significantly lowered the bar for emergency
powers by deferring to the judgment of the Executive for the
determination of necessity.
A. Ransoming the Public for Power
The circumstances necessitating the Navy training exercises at issue
were not an emergency under either NEPA or the common law. In 1978,
the CEQ, which has the authority to issue regulations interpreting
NEPA,87 promulgated a regulation allowing the federal government to
act “without observing the provisions of [the] regulation[]” when
“emergency circumstances make it necessary.”88 This regulation would
seem to be a codification of the implicit emergency powers of the
Executive, as pertaining to NEPA. However, neither the regulation itself,
nor any judicial interpretations of the statute have provided a definition
for emergency circumstances. This requires an interpreter to look to the
common law, as well as at general practice under the statute to discover
its significance.
Under the common law, an emergency is “an unforeseen
combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action without
time for full deliberation.”89 Using this definition, emergencies require
both unpredictability and immediate action. Though the District Court’s
injunction in Winter may have created a necessity that called for
immediate action, the injunction was not an unforeseeable event. NEPA
has been in effect since 1969, and “training exercises [] have been taking
place in [Southern California] for the last 40 years.”90 Moreover, the
Navy has “described the ability to operate MFA sonar,” a key component

411 (1999) (stating that it was through a claim of temporary emergency powers that Julius Cæsar
was able to become dictator for life).
86. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 530 (2008)
(“[N]one of the framers . . . advocated dictatorial powers for the executive, even in wartime.”).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2006) (stating that the CEQ has authority “to formulate and
recommend national policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the environment”).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2009).
89. BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990); 57 AM. JUR . 2D Municipal, etc., Tort
Liability § 397 (2008) (“An emergency is a sudden or unexpected event or combination of
circumstances calling for immediate action.”).
90. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008).

149]

FORGET THE WHALES

161

of its training exercises, “as a “highly perishable skill” that must be
repeatedly practiced under realistic conditions.” 91 Under circumstances
where the Navy should reasonably foresee its need to conduct future
exercises and where the Navy has always had to comply with the statute
in order to conduct those exercises, it is not reasonable to conclude that
the Navy could not have foreseen the necessity of preparing an EIS.
Additionally, general tort law requires governmental entities that
seek the protection of emergency doctrines to not have created or
contributed to the emergency in question. 92 This is another instance
where the Supreme Court has stretched the definition of emergency in
order to accommodate the Executive. Because of the foreseeability of the
need to file an EIS, the District Court’s emergency-creating injunction
could have been avoided if the Navy had properly followed procedure
from the beginning. It was only because of the Navy’s negligence or
reckless disregard for the law, that the emergency was created. 93
The Executive’s previous record in making alternative arrangements
for NEPA compliance confirms the common law requirements of an
emergency. Other occasions where alternative arrangements have been
made include disasters such as: wildfires in San Diego, grasshopper
infestations in Arizona, Hurricane Katrina relief, and even an impending
war in the Persian Gulf.94 In the past, each time the Executive exercised
its power to go beyond the boundaries of the statute, it was the result of
an unforeseeable circumstance that required immediate action and was
not the direct result of previous executive action.

91. Id. at 377.
92. 57 AM. J UR. 2D Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 397 (2008). This is immensely similar to
the equitable “clean hands” doctrine. In cases of equity, such as this one, where a party seeks
injunctive relief, it is necessary that the party approaching the court come with “clean hands.”
Because the “clean hands” doctrine is such a fundamental concept of equity jurisprudence, Richards
v. Tibaldi, 726 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), “he who has done iniquity cannot have equity,”
Sorum v. Schwartz, 411 N.W.2d 652, 655 (N.D. 1987). Consequently, in many jurisdictions, failing
to have clean hands results in a complete bar to claims in equity. E.g. Wilson v. Brown, 897 S.W.2d
546, 549–50 (Ark. 1995). However, this doctrine, although comparable to this case in that it should
not allow the Navy to claim the protection of an emergency doctrine, is not applicable in this
situation. It was the Natural Resources Defense Council that petitioned the Northern District of
California for equitable relief, and not the United States Navy. Therefore, the Navy is not asking for
its own form of equitable relief, but a reversal of the lower courts’ decision to grant equitable relief
to its adversary.
93. The Ninth Circuit also caught on to this manufactured emergency, though only as a
reason for why the Navy should not prevail on the merits. It did not, however, address the
implications of the principle. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 681–82 (9th
Cir. 2008).
94. NEPA, Alternative Arrangements Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Section 1506.11-Emergencies,
http://www. nepa.gov/nepa/eis/alternative_arrangements_ Chart_092908.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2009).
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Under the circumstances, “if the Navy sought to avoid its NEPA
obligations, its remedy [laid] in the Legislative Branch.” 95 However,
under this new definition of emergency powers handed down by the
Court, the Executive no longer needs the Legislature. Hypothetically, the
public safety, put in danger only through the Executive’s reckless
disregard for the law, may be ransomed again with emergency power.
B. The Executive Will Necessarily Favor the Executive
According to the Navy, the declaration that the Navy’s training
exercises were “‘essential to national security’” and that the injunction
would “‘create[] a significant and unreasonable risk’” to the American
people, 96 combined with CEQ’s alternative arrangements, “eliminated
the injunction’s legal foundation.”97 Although the Supreme Court refused
to specifically rule on whether the Executive’s actions actually relieved
the Navy of its obligations, 98 the Court used those very same statements
from the Executive to vacate the lower court’s injunction and effectively
rule that the circumstances did not require the Navy to comply with the
Act. 99
Admittedly, “neither the Members of [the Supreme] Court nor most
federal judges,” nor the author of this Note for that matter, “begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our
Nation and its people.”100 Moreover, the Executive is probably the most
qualified of all the branches of government to make determinations
concerning emergencies and the imminence of dangerous attacks on the
American people.
However, deferring to the Executive by granting it unfettered review
of its own policies completely abolishes the boundaries found in Justice
Jackson’s nadir. Indeed, without independent review, “the false pretext
of imminent danger” creates an additional zenith of executive power. 101
Yet, unlike Jackson’s zenith,102 here the Executive reaches this summit of
power independently. The resulting effects on the separation of powers
are vast. In practice, an Executive could claim “emergency” or

95. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 391 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
96. Id. at 373.
97. Id. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 381 (stating that the Court was not addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims).
99. Id. at 376.
100. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2276–77 (2008).
101. Saby Ghoshray, False Consciousness and Presidential War Power: Examining the
Shadowy Bends of Constitutional Curvature, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 165, 184 (2009).
102. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that for the President to be at the zenith of his powers, he necessarily has to act
with the approbation of the legislature).
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“necessity” to justify any actions contrary to the law whenever it felt that
such actions were prudent. 103
Additionally, affording the Executive the prerogative to interpret the
extent of its own emergency license will necessarily lower the threshold
for a constitutionally permissible suspension of the normal balance of
powers. When it comes to the use of executive-executed emergency
powers, an Executive will be faced with two choices: First, it could
refrain from exercising emergency powers at the risk of an emergency
actually occurring, and then call upon those powers anyway in order to
remedy the situation. Alternatively, the Executive might mitigate risks by
exercising the power immediately at the expense of the constitutional
balance of powers. Obviously, the latter choice leads to a propensity to
call upon emergency powers even when necessity would not require
them. 104
Prior to Winter, the Supreme Court had already taken a position on
this issue: “a state of war,” the most severe of emergencies, “is not a
blank check for the President.”105 However, in “giv[ing] great deference
to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest,”106 the Supreme
Court disregards Youngstown’s boundaries of presidential power and
103. Interestingly, this idea was proposed years before Winter went to the Supreme Court, and
was often used to justify the abuses of the Bush Administration. See John C. Yoo, With “All
Necessary and Appropriate Force,” L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at B13 (“General criminal laws are
usually not interpreted to apply to either [the President or the military], because otherwise they could
interfere with the president’s constitutional responsibility to manage wartime operations.”).
104. A very similar dichotomy has been explored in free speech jurisprudence when
considering principles of prior restraint. Scholars recognize that professional censors have a
propensity toward adverse decision. For example, when a censor’s role is to examine material and
determine that it is unobjectionable before it is released to the general public, that censor is
encountered with two choices. First, the censor may be lenient toward the material, at the risk that it
will actually be offensive to the public, causing general harm and putting that censor’s job at risk.
Second, the censor may choose to take a more conservative approach by censoring anything that is
remotely objectionable, protecting the public from any faint risk of harm preserving her own job.
Obviously, the incentives lie in favor of increased censorship. See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 657 (1955). In order to protect constitutional
freedoms, the Supreme Court is very wary of state structures that have a propensity to create
perverse incentives. See, e.g., Freedman v. State of Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (allowing
government film censorship “only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate
the dangers of a censorship system”). It follows that in order to protect constitutional structures, such
as the separation of powers, the Court should likewise be wary of broad doctrines that have that
same tendency to lead to abuses of power.
105. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343
U.S. at 587).
106. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 377 (2008) (citing Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). Interestingly, the case that Justice Roberts cites to justify his
position of deference to the executive branch [i.e. the military] involved the necessity of allowing the
military the independence to create regulations for its own members and not to take a ctions outside
of its own sphere contrary to enacted law. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507–08. Regrettably, citing that
decision erroneously creates a false standard of deference to military operations, placing them
beyond the reach of ordinary law.
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cedes its important role of exercising judicial review to the Executive. 107
This, essentially, grants the Executive carte blanche in determining
when, and to what extent, he or she may rely on emergency
circumstances to justify his or her actions. Such a ruling is a blank check
for abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
It may be tempting to brush Winter aside because the Supreme Court
did not reach a decision on the merits due to the nature of the suit, but
one should remember that fifty years ago, another case, more explicitly
concerning the limits of presidential powers, sought after the same
remedy. 108 Both cases occurred during a period when the United States
was at war.109 In each case, the Executive’s actions were directly
contrary to congressional will. 110 Most importantly, in both situations,
because of emergency circumstances, the Executive Branch justified its
actions as necessary in defense of the public good. 111
Nevertheless, in Winter, the Supreme Court departs from the
standard set half a century ago in Youngstown. By finding in favor of the
Navy, the Court altered the accepted Jackson taxonomy by expanding its
zone of twilight, and diminishing its nadir. Winter accomplished this by
first revising the definition of an emergency—eliminating its requirement
of unforeseeability and permitting an Executive to seek the protection of
emergency powers for manufactured emergencies caused by the reckless
disregard of the law or negligence of that Executive. Second, the Winter
decision allows the Executive to “be the judge in [its] own case,” 112

107. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
108. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 372 (stating that the respondents had sought an injunction
against the Navy), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584–85 (1952) (stating that the steel companies
sought an injunction against the Secretary of Commerce restraining the enforcement of President
Truman’s order).
109. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376–77 (referring to the hostile circumstances abroad to
justify the denial of the respondent’s injunction), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 590–91 (appendix)
(referring to the Korean Conflict as a necessary reason for permitting the President to seize the steel
factories).
110. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the Navy’s
publication of its EIS, scheduled after the completion of its exercises, defeats the purpose of NEPA),
with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (stating that five years prior to the President Truman’s executive
order, Congress had already rejected granting a government authorization for the seizure of private
property in the event of an emergency).
111. Compare Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 373 (stating that the President considered the Naval
exercises to be “essential to national security”), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583 (stating that
President Truman believed that the continued availability of steel was of capital importance to the
security of the United States).
112. According to the old maxims of law, making an individual a judge in his own case was a
direct violation of due process, or the law of the land. Essentially, it meant that a judge was not
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deferring to [it] for a determination of when emergency circumstances
are present, creating an incentive for Executives to call upon those
powers more often and under circumstances that are less than public
emergencies.
During their confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito firmly declared their concurrence with Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown opinion. Ironically, two years later, they were possibly
accomplice to one of the most significant expansions of executive power
to date.
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